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TAXING STOCK DIVIDENDS AND
ECONOMIC THEORY
STEPHEN B. COHEN*
Since 1936, the Internal Revenue Code has treated elective stock
dividends on common stock, which are taxed on receipt as share-
holder ordinary income gain, differently from pro rata stock div-
idends on common, which are received tax-free.' This difference in
treatment was reenacted in Section 305 of the 1954 Code; 2 and
while the Tax Reform Act of 1969 changed many details of stock
dividend taxation,8 the basic distinction between elective and pro
rata stock dividends was, if anything, reinforced.4 The major pur-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. A.B., 1967,
Amherst College; LL.B., 1971, Yale University.
1. Section 115(f) of the Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 740, ch. 690,
§ 115(f), 49 Stat. 1688. Section 115(f) was reenacted without change in
the Internal Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 2, 53 Stat. 47. Unless indicated other-
wise, all section references are to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, as amended
[hereinafter cited as CODE].
2. Section 305 (a) states the general rule that "gross income does not
include the amount of any distribution of the stock of a corporation made
by such corporation to its shareholders with respect to its stock." Section
305(b) (1) [which from 1954 to 1969 was section 305(b) (2)] states an ex-
ception for a dividend payable at the shareholder's election, in stock or
other property. Distributions of stock falling within the section 305(b)
exception are taxed under section 301 which imposes a shareholder ordi-
nary income tax to the extent of corporate earnings and profits.
3. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. See S. REP.
No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 151 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part
I), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1969); Hearings on the Subject of Tax Re-
form Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong. 1st
Sess., pt. 14, at 5193 (1969); Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 62 (1969).
The 1969 Tax Reform Act provided additional exceptions to the gen-
eral rule of Section 305(a). See note 2 supra. Technical explanations
can be found in B. BrrrKE & J. EusTIcE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ch. 7, 7.62, 7.63 (abr. student ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as BITTKER & EUsTICE]; Andrews & Wilson, Stock Divi-
dend Taxation Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969: Expansion of an Omi-
nous Past, 13 ARiz. L. REv..751 (1971); Bashian, Stock Dividends and Sec-
tion 305: Realization and the Constitution, 1971 DuKE L.J. 1105; Commit-
tee on Corporate Taxation, N.Y.S. Bar Association Tax Section, Comments
on Proposed Regulations Under Section 305 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, as Amended by Section 421 of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 49
TAXES 460 (1971); Metzer, The "New" Section 305, 27 TAx L. REV. 93 (1971);
Rustigan, Stock Distributions--Section 305, 49 TAXES 787 (1971); Tierney,
Proposed Regs. Under Section 305 Amplify Treasury's Tough Posture on
Stock Dividends, 35 J. TAXATION 86 (1971); Tierney, Proposed Regs. Under
305(c) May Create Unexpected Taxable Stock Dividends, 35 J. TAXATION
184 (1971).
4. BrrTKEn & EUSTICE, note 3 supra.
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pose of the 1969 amendments to Section 305 was to impose a share-
holder ordinary income tax on transactions with the same substance,
but lacking the formal indicia, of the receipt of elective stock divi-
dends on common stock.5 Therefore, a reexamination of the ration-
ale for current distinctions between taxable and nontaxable stock
dividends is particularly appropriate.
The rationale for attributing different tax consequences to the
receipt of elective and pro rata stock dividends emerged from the
basic tax distinction between corporate earnings distributed to
shareholders and corporate earnings retained for reinvestment.
In general, distributed earnings are taxed at the ordinary income
rate applicable to the individual shareholder upon distribution.,
Retained earnings, with minor exceptions, 7 are never directly at-
tributed or imputed to individual shareholders but are taxed as
gain to shareholders on the sale of stock to the extent that the
sales price reflects earnings retained.8 Like all gain on the sale of
stock, retained earnings receive (i) preferential capital gain treat-
5. See Levin, Corporate Adjustments, in A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 29 (1970) (Practising Law Institute); Levin,
Principal Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 On Corporations, 52 Ci.
B. RECORD 25, 35-39 (1970).
6. CODE §§ 301, 316. Exceptions to this general rule are provided
for certain distributions that involve a significant termination of share-
holder interest under sections 302 and 331. Section 302 (a) grants capital
gain sale treatment to distributions in redemption of stock that substan-
tially reduce a stockholder's proportionate interest in the corporation under
the standards of section 302(b). Because its main purpose is to facilitiate
major shifts in the control of closely-held businesses, it has been argued
that section 302 (a) should not apply to distributions by publicly-held cor-
porations in redemption of common shares. See Bacon, Share Redemptions
by Publicly Held Companies: A New Look at Dividend Equivalence, 26
TAx. L. REV. 283 (1971); Chirelstein, Optional Redemptions and Optional
Dividends: Taxing the Re-purchase of Common Shares, 78 YALE L.J. 739
(1969). When earnings previously retained are distributed in partial or
complete liquidation, they generally receive capital gain treatment under
section 331 (a). However, the shareholder may elect a section 333 liquida-
tion which produces ordinary income tax treatment of distributed earnings,
and there is nonrecognition of gain on the liquidation of a subsidiary cor-
poration into a parent under section 332.
In addition, section 303 (a) grants capital gain sale treatment to dis-
tributions in redemption of stock from an estate to pay death taxes and
funeral and administration expenses.
See generally BITTKER & EUSTICE, chs. 7, 9, 11.
7. Domestic shareholders of foreign personal holding companies and
certain other foreign corporations are taxed on their proportionate share
of undistributed corporate income. See CODE §§ 551, 951. In addition,
shareholders of a close corporation may elect to be taxed as a partnership.
CODE § 1373.
8. There is abundant empirical evidence that market prices adjust to
reflect retained earnings with a high degree of efficiency. See Fama, Effi-
cient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J.
FIN. 383 (1970). The sales price negotiated for close corporation stock
typically reflects the value of all corporate assets, including assets acquired
by reinvestment of earnings.
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ment;9 (ii) tax deferral until disposition of the stock, which may not
occur until many years after the earnings are generated; 10 and
(iii) complete tax forgiveness, if the shareholder holds the stock un-
til his death, so that any gain attributable to retention is absorbed
by a stepped-up basis." Consequently, individual investors ob-
tain a significant tax advantage when corporate earnings are re-
tained for reinvestment.
Taxation of any stock dividend as shareholder ordinary income
gain constitutes a departure from the basic tax distinction between
distributed and retained earnings. Whereas a dividend in cash
reduces earnings available for reinvestment, a dividend in stock
does not.1 2 A stock dividend, to the contrary, is commonly issued
to reflect the amount by which retained earnings increase the
value of shareholder equity. In the absence of a stock dividend,
this equity increase is reflected in appreciation in the value of
shares originally held. The taxation of any stock dividend, there-
fore, should be identified as a shareholder ordinary income tax
on undistributed and retained corporate profits, inconsistent with
the general proposition that retained earnings are taxed only as
capital gain when stock is sold. It is essentially for this reason that
pro rata stock dividends on common have been granted tax-free
treatment since 1920.13
The tax treatment of elective stock dividends, in contrast, does de-
part from the basic tax distinction between retained and distrib-
uted earnings. Even though they reflect equity appreciation in
the corporation, elective stock dividends have been treated as a
distribution of cash. This tax treatment has been traditionally
justified in terms of the constructive receipt doctrine.' 4 Since
the stock dividend is elective, the shareholder who receives stock
could, had he desired, have received a cash distribution instead. He
is therefore treated as constructively receiving a distribution of
cash because it was in his power to obtain a cash distribution in
lieu of stock.
The constructive receipt doctrine, however, draws untenable lines
between taxable and nontaxable events when applied to stock
9. CODE § 1221.
10. Id. §§ 1001-02.
11. Id. § 1014(a).
12. Compare this conclusion with the Senate Report on the 1954 Code
recommending that most stock dividends be received tax-free: "As long
as a shareholder's interest remains in corporate solution, there is no ap-
propriate occasion for the imposition of a tax. Accordingly, the general
rule is that no tax is imrosed uron the distribution of ... stock dividends
." SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1954).
13. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
14. Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1936 Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., at 593. See also Lester Lumber
Co., 14 T.C. 255 (1950); S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1969);
Metzer, The "New" Section 305, 27 TAX L. REV. 93, 102 (1971).
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dividend taxation. This becomes evident once the opportunity
to elect a dividend in stock or in cash is identified as provid-
ing a choice between two different rates of cash payout. In the
case of publicly-traded stock, for example, compare the recipi-
ent of an elective stock dividend with an investor who holds low
payout stock. Clearly, the recipient of the elective stock dividend
could have received a higher rate of cash payout by electing a cash
dividend instead of a stock dividend; but, just as clearly, the investor
holding low payout stock could have also obtained a higher rate
of cash payout. The market in publicly-traded stock offers a wide
range of cash payout rates,15 and the investor holding low payout
stock could have easily acquired stock with a higher cash payout
rate. Since both investors could have received a higher cash pay-
out, logically they should be treated in a similar manner. The
only difference between these two investors lies in the cost of
changing the cash payout rate on their investment portfolios.
Where an elective stock dividend is offered, the investor can change
his election, and therefore his cash payout rate, tax free; whereas,
in the absence of elective stock dividends, the investor can change
his cash payout rate only by switching stocks and incurring a
possible capital gains tax and brokerage fees. This difference,
however, does not justify taxing the receipt of elective stock div-
idends at shareholder ordinary income rates. It merely suggests
that a change of cash payout rate accomplished by a change in
election should be treated as a taxable sale. This would entail
imposing a capital gains tax on the appreciation in the stock on
which an election is offered whenever an investor changes his
election from a cash dividend to a stock dividend or a stock divi-
dend to a cash dividend.' 6
15. A survey of the dividend policies of the "Fortune 500" for 1967 pro-
duced the following results:
Most of the companies in Fortune's 500 list followed a "middle
course" in their dividend policy; last year 340 of them paid out be-
tween 31 and 70 percent of their earnings per common share in cash
dividends ....
The thirty-nine companies that do not pay cash dividends in-
clude some that don't believe in them . . . and some that can't af-
ford them . . . . At the other end of the spectrum are companies
whose dividends exceeded earnings, either because the earnings were
depressed . . . or non-existent . . . . In between these two extremes
are a few companies that pay only nominal dividends-say, 5 to
10 percent of earnings .... [T]here were twenty-six [companies]
that ... paid a combination of cash and stock, and ten paying stock
alone.
Similar distribution charts for the various "fifty" lists in this
issue would show the merchandisers spread out in a pattern similar
to that of the 500; the transportation companies leaning toward
lower payouts, with thirty of them below 50 percent; the banks over-
whelmingly bunched in the middle; and the utilities just as over-
whelmingly bunched somewhat above the middle (thirty-one paid
out between 56 and 70 uercent of earnings).
Loomis, A Case for Dropping Dividends, 77 FoRTuNE, June 15, 1968, at
184.
16. Certain corporate multi-class capital structures are treated as creat-
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The constructive receipt rationale also draws questionable lines
in the case of closely-held stock. It is difficult, for example, to
distinguish the opportunity to choose stock or cash afforded by an
elective stock dividend from the power of any controlling share-
holder to cause distribution or retention of corporate earnings.
Only in the case of the elective stock dividend is the shareholder
currently taxed. Yet, consistent application of the constructive re-
ceipt doctrine would require taxation as ordinary income gain in
both instances since the controlling shareholder or group of share-
holders, like shareholders offered an elective stock dividend, have
the power to obtain a cash distribution.17 Rigorous application of
ing constructive elective stock dividends under the 1969 amendments to
section 305. For example, if a corporation issues two classes of common
stock, one class paying dividends in cash, the other paying dividends in
stock, the stock dividend is taxed on receipt as ordinary income gain under
section 305(b) (2). Another possibility is the creation of preferred stock
that is not entitled to cash dividends but is convertible into common stock
at a conversion ratio that increases whenever cash dividends are paid on
common. Under section 305(c) the increase in conversion ratio is treated
as equivalent to the receipt of an elective stock dividend on common, tax-
able at ordinary income rates.
In the capital structures described above, the investor changes his elec-
tion by exchanging one class of common stock for the other or converting
preferred shares into common. Under current law, both changes can be
accomplished taxfree. See CODE §§ 1036, 368(a) (1) (E). This article ar-
gues that elective stock dividends should be received tax free and that
a change in election should be treated as a taxable sale of stock. In the
case of multi-class capital structures, this would entail repealing sections
305(b) (2) and (c) so that constructive elective stock dividends are re-
ceived tax free and sections 1036 and 368 (a) (1) (E) insofar as they permit
tax-free exchanges that, in effect, cause a change in election altering an
investor's cash payout rate.
17. It is possible to design a transaction with the same effect as a close-
corporation elective stock dividend, but with significantly lower tax cost.
To illustrate, suppose Z Corporation has assets of $110, an earnings and
profits account of $10, and two shareholders A and B, each owning 50
shares or 50% of the stock. Z Corporation offers its shareholders a choice
between a cash dividend of 10 cents per share or a stock dividend of one-
tenth share of common stock, per share. A elects the cash and receives$5, and B elects the stock and receives 5 additional shares. After pay-
ment of the dividends, but before taxes are imposed: (1) the corporation
has $105 in assets; (2) A now owns 50 shares out of 105 or 47.6% of
the stock; and (3) B now owns 55 shares out of 105 or 52.4% of the cor-
poration. If elective stock dividends are taxed, there is $10 of taxable
ordinary income.
The same result could be achieved by a pro rata cash dividend of
5 cents per share or $2.50 to each stockholder, followed by the sale of
2.4 shares from A to B for $2.50. After the dividend cum sale, but before
taxes are imposed: (1) the corporation has $105 in assets remaining; (2)
A now owns 47.6 shares out of 100 or 47.6% of the stock; (3) B now
owns 52.4 shares out of 100 or 52.4% of the stock; and (4) A still ends
up with $5 in cash. Notice that immediately after the cash dividend, value
per share equals assets of $105 divided by 100 shares or $1.05 per share.
Thus, the price of the shares sold to A equals 2.4 times $1.05 or $2.50.
If this second form is respected, there is $5 of taxable ordinary income
and a maximum of $2.50 taxable capital gain or, at the most, the equiva-
'[VOL. 1974:142
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the constructive receipt doctrine would therefore render practically
meaningless the preferential treatment currently afforded retained
earnings.
The difference in the effect of elective and pro rata stock divi-
dends on shareholder ownership interests has also been used to
justify taxing elective stock dividends on common stock. Unlike
pro rata stock dividends, elective stock dividends typically cause
shifts in shareholders' proportionate ownership interests in the
corporation. Such shifts in ownership have long been thought
necessary to constitutionally permit taxation of stock dividends,
and the so-called "proportionate interest" test has been the focus
of most of the recent literature on stock dividend taxation.'8
Aside from the constitutional issue, which is almost certainly ir-
relevant,19 it is difficult to perceive why a shift in proportionate
lent of $6.25 in taxable ordinary income. Unless this dividend cum sale
transaction is recast, taxation of close corporation elective stock dividends
will obviously be futile.
18. See Andrews & Wilson, Stock Dividend Taxation Under the Tax Re-
form Act of 1969: Expansion of an Ominous Past, 13 ARIM. L. REv. 751
(1971); Bashian, Stock Dividends and Section 305: Realization and the
Constitution, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1105; Del Cotto & Wolf, The Proportionate
Interest Test of Section 305 and the Supreme Court, 27 TAx L. REv. 49
(1971); Metzer, The "New" Section 305, 27 TAX L. REv. 93 (1971). Al-
though some commentators have argued that the proportionate interest
test should be abandoned, they have failed to suggest an alternative frame-
work for analysis. See Lowndes, The Taxation of Stock Dividends and
Stock Rights, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 146 (1948); Metzer, supra, at 142.
19. The attention paid to the proportionate interest test grew out of con-
cern with whether a particular stock dividend produced realization, so that
it was constitutional to tax it as income under the sixteenth amendment.
The realization issue first arose in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
The narrow question before the Macomber Court was whether Congress
could impose an income tax on the pro rata distribution of a common
stock dividend on common stock. The Court decided that realization must
occur in order for an income tax to be imposed under the sixteenth amend-
ment. By this, the Court meant that the mere accrual of gain, i.e., a mere
increase in net worth, is not, by itself, sufficient to permit taxation. Some
"separation or transformation" of the gain from what was held prior to
its accrual must occur. Although the Court left unclear what kind of sep-
aration or transformation is necessary for a realization, it held that the
stock dividend before it was without real substance, a mere paper transac-
tion that did not rise to the level of a realization. The discussion of reali-
zation in Macomber inspired extensive comment. See E. SELIGMAN, STUD-
IES IN PUBLIC FINANCE (1925); H. SIMoNs, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 197-
98 (1938); Powell, Stock Dividends, Direct Taxes and the Sixteenth
Amendment, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 536 (1920); Seligman, Implications and
Effects of the Stock Dividend Decision, 21 COLUM. L. REv. 313 (1921).
Believing the Macomber rule applied to all stock dividends, Congress
provided in the 1921 Revenue Act that all stock dividends "shall not be
subject to tax." In 1936, the Supreme Court held that it was constitu-
tional to tax a common stock dividend on preferred stock. Koshland
v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936). Congress responded by providing in
the 1936 Revenue Act that stock dividends were to be taxed whenever
the sixteenth amendment permitted. Later decisions formulated the rule
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interests should cause a stock dividend to be taxed as if it were 'a
cash dividend. In a large publicly-held corporation, changes in
that stock dividends produced realization and thus were constitutionally
taxable whenever they changed the shareholder's proportionate interest in
the corporation. Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604 (1943). For lower
court attempts to apply the proportionate interest test, see Tourtelot v.
Commissioner, 189 F.2d 167 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 901
(1952); Wiegand v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1952); Pizitz v.
Patterson, 183 F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Ala. 1960); Messer v. Commissioner, 20
T.C. 253 (1953).
The common justification for requiring realization is that in a money
economy the separation or transformation of gain usually involves the re-
ceipt of cash, permitting easy measurement of the gain and providing the
taxpayer with liquid assets to satisfy his tax liability. See Slawson, Tax-
ing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock, 76 YALE
L.J. 623, 625 (1967). Realization, however, is not always defined to in-
clude these two factors; in some instances, taxation may occur on separa-
tion or transformation notwithstanding the absence of either ease of ap-
praisal or liquidity, or both. For example, the exchange of one item of
property for another, or barter, without an intervening cash step will pro-
duce realization, as will payment in kind for services rendered. See CODE
§ 1001 (e); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (1973). Viewed in this light, the reali-
zation concept appears to signify a judicial conclusion that taxation in
some instances is inappropriate, rather than a reason for that result. See
Lowndes, supra note 18, at 155. See also H. SIMONS, supra; J. SNEED,
THE CONFIGURATIONS OF GROSS INCOME 71 (1967); Lowndes, Current Con-
ceptions of Taxable Income, 25 OMO ST. L.J. 151 (1964).
Although the Supreme Court has never overruled the Macomber re-
alization requirements, the concept has not been rigorously applied. See,
e.g., Helvering v. Horst. 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S.
461 (1940). Since the Macomber decision in 1920, the Supreme Court has
found an absence of realization in only one case, Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S.
242 (1924), and the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service have been
allowed wide discretion to define when realization has occurred. It is dif-
ficult, therefore, to believe that the realization requirement would today
pose a serious obstacle to the taxation of any stock dividend.
Once a tax on stock dividends is viewed as a shareholder tax on un-
distributed corporate profits, the lack of a realization obstacle to taxing
any stock dividend is apparent. In the case of closely-held corporations,
such a tax would no more violate a realization requirement than the rule
that all partnership profits be taxed annually to the partners, whether dis-
tributed to them or reinvested in the business. See CODE § 702(a). The
Macomber Court distinguished the partnership case by implication on the
ground that each partner has the legal right to compel distribution of his
share of the earnings while the stockholder normally does not. Eisner
v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 214 (1920). Nonlegal constraints, however, of-
ten make this legal power irrelevant. Bittker, Comprehensive Tax Base,
83 HARV. L. REV. 925, 977 (1967). See also Lowndes, Taxing the Income
of the Close Corporation, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., 558, 580-83 (1953).
Moreover, in some circumstances, a shareholder, like a partner, may be
able to compel payment of a dividend. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIREL-
STEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 407-12, 442-46 (1972). Thus, the Macomber
Court's justification for the differential tax treatment accorded close cor-
porations and partnerships is unpersuasive.
The realization requirement also appears to be without justification
in the case of publicly-owned corporations. In the public corporation, ac-
cumulated earnings are reflected in the appreciation in the market value
of stock. This increase in Value can be analogized to the growing value
[VOL. 1974:142
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proportionate interests are virtually always trivial because of the
large number of shareholders. In a close corporation, an elective
stock dividend is more likely to cause a substantial shift in pro-
portionate ownership interests. But should that be the desired
result, the investors would almost certainly adopt a Section 302 (b)
redemption form to achieve it instead of an elective stock divi-
dend.2 0 Due to the congressional policy favoring substantial shifts
in ownership of closely-held businesses, a qualifying Section
302(b) redemption will not, under current law, produce any tax
consequences for the nonredeeming shareholders. 21 Viewed in
this manner, the proportionate interest test, like the constructive
receipt rationale, does not provide a sound basis for triggering or-
dinary income taxation of stock dividends.
Given the basic tax distinction between distributed and retained
earnings, the crucial variable in corporate-shareholder taxation is
the allocation of corporate earnings between distribution and re-
tention. With the exception of stock dividends, the Internal Rev-
enue Code generally respects the allocation chosen. If stock divi-
dends had no effect on this allocation, there would be little reason
for treating them differently from other equity appreciation in
of a savings account as interest accrues on the initial deposit. (This anal-
ogy is borrowed from Slawson, supra, at 625). The savings interest is
available in liquid form to the owner whenever he desires it; thus, it is
realized in the year it accrues, even if not withdrawn. See Thomas Wat-
son, 12 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 1141 (1943). Similarly, apprecia-
tion in publicly-traded stock is easily measured and can be made available
in liquid form by a sale of the stock. In fact, it is not much harder to
order a broker to sell stock than it is to withdraw interest from a savings
account. For all these reasons, the realization requirement should be and
probably is irrelevant to stock dividend taxation. See also Helvering v.
Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 421 (Douglas, J., dissenting); J. SNEED, supra, at
71; Bittker, Charitable Gifts of Income and the Internal Revenue Code:
Another View, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1375, 1380 (1952).
20. For example, suppose X Corp. has assets of $200, an earnings and
profits account of $100, and 2 shareholders, A and B, each of whom owns
20 shares or 50% of the outstanding common stock. Value per common
share is then 200/40 or $5/share. If X Corp. redeems 10 shares from B for
$50, the result will be capital gain for B under section 302 (b) (2) and no
tax consequences to A under Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3d
Cir. 1958), acquiesced, Rev. Rul. 58-614, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 920. After the
redemption transaction is completed, A will own 20 shares or 2/ of the
outstanding stock; B will own 10 shares or 1/ of the outstanding stock; and
B will have received $50 in assets, before taxes, from X Corp.
The same result could have been achieved by offering each shareholder
a dividend payable in 20 shares of stock or $50 in cash. If A elects stock
and B elects cash, then both are treated under sections 305(b) (1) and
301 as receiving an ordinary income dividend. Notice that after the trans-
action is completed A will own 40 shares or % of the outstanding stock;
B will own 20 shares or % of the outstanding stock; and B will have re-
ceived $50 in assets, before taxes, from X Corp.
21. Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958), acquiesced,
Rev. Rul, 58-614, 1958-2 CuM. BuLL. 920. See Chirelstein, supra note 6,
at 750.
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stock that involves no actual payout of corporate assets and simply
reflects earnings retained. This observation suggests that the cen-
tral question in stock dividend taxation should not be whether a
shareholder has constructively received a corporate distribution or
whether there has been a shift in shareholder proprietary interest
in the corporation. Rather, the central issue should be how, if
at all, do stock dividends, if received tax-free, affect the 'allocation
of corporate earnings between distribution and retention.
This article uses recent work in economics to examine the effect
of stock dividends on the allocation of corporate earnings between
distribution and retention in a hypothetical world that provides
tax-free treatment for all stock dividends, both pro rata and elec-
tive. The discussion assumes throughout that corporate stock is
easily marketable, and, consequently, the analysis is relevant only
to the problems of publicly-traded stock. However, where appro-
priate, the footnotes develop modifications that would be required
to extend the analysis to nonmarketable closely-held stock.2 2 The
analysis will indicate that (1) stock dividends, if received tax free,
may, to some undetermined extent, increase the proportion of
corporate earnings retained for reinvestment and that (2) taxing
stock dividends to avoid this outcome creates inequitable differ-
ences among both taxpayers and corporations. The article will
first review the relevant work in the economics of dividends and
analyze the effect of stock dividends on investor portfolio selec-
tion. The article will then discuss the role of stock dividends in
corporate dividend policy. The conclusion will suggest more equi-
table methods of reducing the preferential treatment afforded re-
tained earnings.
I. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF DIVIDENDS
A. The Irrelevance of Dividends Proposition
We begin by assuming a world in which: 1) there are no taxes
or transaction costs; 2) a dollar of retained earnings always in-
creases common stock values by at least one dollar; and 3) share-
holders always behave in a rational manner. Under these con-
ditions, investors will be indifferent to the allocation of corporate
earnings between distribution and retention; simply stated, divi-
dends are irrelevant.23  If earnings are distributed instead of re-
tained, corporate investment can be financed through the sale of
22. See note 17 supra and notes 45, 49, 50, and 75 infra.
23. The source of the irrelevance of dividends proposition is Miller &
Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J.
Bus. 411 (1961). For nontechnical explanations see W. BAUMOL, THE
STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 53-59, 72-79 (1965); R. BREALEY,
SECURITY PRICES IN A COMPETrIIVE MARKET 6-8 (1971); A. ROBICHEK & S.
MYERS, OPTIMAL FINANCING DECISIONS 51-66 (1965). A more mathematical
exposition (but not as technical as the original Miller and Modigliani ar-
ticle) can be found in S. DOBROVOLSKY, THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE FI-
NANCE 70-94 (1971).
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additional stock. Shareholder wealth remains constant whether
corporate investment is financed through retaining earnings and
skipping dividends or distributing earnings and selling more stock.
When earnings are retained, the current cash dividend is less,
,but the shareholder's interest is not diluted by the sale of addi-
tional stock.24 It can be demonstrated that the value lost through
a lower current dividend exactly offsets the value gained by avoid-
ing dilution of shareholder equity.25 Moreover, shareholder pref-
24. When earnings are distributed, the current dividend is larger, but
the shareholder's interest in the corporation is diluted by the sale of more
stock. The value gained through a larger current dividend exactly offsets
the value lost in dilution of shareholder equity. See note 25 infra.
25. To illustrate the "irrelevance of dividends" thesis, assume X Corp.
has outstanding 100,000 shares of common stock; that it earns $1,000,000
annually, or $10 per share, all of which it normally pays out in dividends;
and that its stock normally sells at $100, reflecting a 10% capitalization
rate. Assume further that management has identified a new investment
opportunity, involving the same degree of risk as present operations, that
will require an immediate outlay of $1,000,000 and is expected to generate
earnings of $200,000 annually in perpetuity. If the investment is made,
X Corp's annual earnings are expected to increase to $1,200,000. As the
company has no further investment plans, all earnings from the expanded
operation will be distributed as dividends. Assume that X Corp. can fi-
nance the expansion in either of the two following ways:
i) Retained Earnings. X Corp. could distribute no dividends to its
shareholders this year and use its current earnings of $1,000,000 to finance
the new investment. In that event, the expected dividends for all future
years will be $1,200,000 or $12 per share. Capitalizing these future divi-
dends at a 10% rate, the present value of a share of X Corp. will be $120.
ii) New Stock Issue. X Corp. could pay a dividend of $1,000,000 to
its shareholders and finance the new investment by selling $1,000,000 of
additional common stock. Present shareholders of X Corp. would receive
a current cash dividend of $10 per share. Their wealth would consist of
the $10 dividend plus the value of the X stock after the proposed stock
issue and the new investment. The value of X stock, in turn, will depend
on the number of additional shares that must be sold in order to raise
$1,000,000. If n = the number of shares to be sold and P = price per
share, then n X P = $1,000,000. We know that the issue price of the new
X shares will be ten times the expected dividend per share (given the
capitalization rate of 10%). Hence: P = 10 x $1,200,000/100,000 + n.
The expected dividends still rise to $1,200,000 to reflect the new invest-
ment, but the number of shares outstanding is increased by n to reflect
the new stock issue.
When these equations are solved for n and P (by substituting the
right-hand side of the second equation into the first), it turns out that
n = 9090.9 and P = $110. Thus, X Corp. can finance the new investment
by selling 9090.9 shares for $110 per share. Future dividends will be
$1,200,000/109,090.9 or $11 per share. At the 10% capitalization rate, the
value of X stock will be $110 per share. Accordingly, for each X share
they now own, present shareholders will have a $10 cash dividend plus
$110 in share value, or total wealth of $120 per share, just as in i) above.
Since the total wealth figure is the same for both financing techniques,
shareholders should logically be indifferent to the company's dividend pol-
icy and will be just as happy whether the company finances the new in-
vestment with retained earnings or a new stock issue. This example is
borrowed from V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTFIN, CoRpoRATE FINANCE 427-
29 (1972).
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erences for cash versus reinvestment do not affect the irrelevance
of dividends proposition. An investor who desires more cash than
is distributed can sell some stock to make up the shortfall, while
an investor desiring a higher level of reinvestment can use excess
cash distributions to acquire more stock. However, in the real
world, departures from the assumed conditions distort this pat-
tern.
B. Taxes and Transaction Costs
Once taxes and transaction costs are introduced, there exists a
powerful incentive for the individual (as opposed to the corporate
or tax-exempt) 26 investor to select a portfolio of securities with a
low rate of cash payout. For the shareholder who desires rein-
vestment of earnings, retention by the corporation provides rein-
vestment at no immediate tax cost. On the other hand, if earnings
were distributed, they would be taxed to the shareholder as or-
dinary income before reinvestment. In addition, the individual
shareholder would have to incur brokerage fees to acquire addi-
tional stock.2 7 The shareholder who desires cash for consumption
can substitute the sale of a portion of his shares for the receipt
of a cash dividend. Cash received from the sale will be taxed only
in part, due to the immediate recovery of the basis of the shares
sold, and then only at preferential capital gains rates; whereas a
cash dividend would be taxed in full and as ordinary income. In
theory, brokerage fees, which must be paid on the sale of stock,
could outweigh the tax advantage of selling stock over receiving
cash dividends. But, in practice, brokerage fees will virtually
always be insignificant compared to the tax advantage,28 given
the current structure of both tax rates and brokerage fees.29
26. Corporate shareholders are likely to prefer cash dividends, taxable
under the intercorporate deduction at an effective rate of about 7.2%, to
equity appreciation, taxable at a capital gains rate of 30%. Section 243
of the Code allows a corporation to deduct 85% of dividends received from
domestic corporations. Corporate income above $25,000 is taxed at a rate
of 48%. See CODE § 11. Therefore, the effective rate on corporate income
derived from dividends is about 15% times 48% or about 7.2%.
For tax exempt institutions there is obviously no tax advantage to
a low cash payout rate because by definition they pay no taxes.
27. If, however, the corporation offers an automatic dividend reinvest-
ment plan, brokerage fees will be de minimis. See note 30 infra and ac-
companying text.
28. In contrast, tax exempt institutions gain no tax advantage whatso-
ever to offset the transaction costs of selling stock and will therefore prefer
cash dividends to retained earnings to satisfy cash needs.
29. The following example demonstrates that the tax advantage of sub-
stituting periodic sales for cash dividends will virtually always exceed the
brokerage fees for individual investors. Assume, for example, that an in-
vestor desires to obtain a cash flow of $1000 annually from his investment
portfolio. The after-tax proceeds of $1000 in cash dividends equal $1000(l-t) where t is the individual ordinary income tax rate of the investor.
The after-tax proceeds from $1000 received from the sale of stock equals
$1000-($1000-b).5t where b is the basis of the shares sold and .5t is
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Therefore, regardless of shareholder preferences for reinvestment
or consumption, there is a significant tax incentive for individuals
to prefer low payout stock over high payofit stock.
Despite this tax incentive, many individuals select portfolios with
a high rate of cash payout. Probably the most dramatic evidence
of this fact is the large number of investors who participate in
"automatic dividend reinvestment plans. ' 30 Under such a plan,
the investor directs the corporation to deposit his cash dividends
with a designated bank. The bank then uses the dividends to pur-
chase additional stock in bulk on the market and forwards the
stock to participating investors. The purported advantage of the
plan is that it provides a collective buying arrangement with sub-
stantially lower brokerage costs than those incurred upon indi-
vidual reinvestment of cash dividends. However, the plan's par-
ticipants must still pay ordinary income tax on cash dividends
deposited for them with the bank. Participation therefore appears
irrational since an investor could just as easily obtain automatic
reinvestment of earnings at zero brokerage costs and an enormous
tax saving simply by holding low payout stock.
This kind of behavior might be comprehensible if high payout
stock sold in the market at a discount relative to low payout stock
the capital gains tax rate of the investor. For the purposes of this exam-
ple, assume that the basis is zero so that the after-tax proceeds are simply
$1000-500t. This will understate the after-tax proceeds of selling stock and
therefore bias the results in favor of cash dividends. The tax advantage
of selling shares is the difference between the after-tax proceeds of the
sale and the after-tax proceeds of cash dividends or $1000-500t - $1000(1-t)
500t.
The brokerage costs of selling stock are 1000f where f is the commis-
sion as a percentage of the dollar amount sold. Then selling shares to
obtain cash is preferable to cash dividends provided that 1000f is less than
500t, or f is less than t/2. This equation can be interpreted to mean that
the tax rate applicable to cash dividends must be more than twice the
percentage brokerage commission in order for periodic sales to be prefer-
able to cash dividends. Since brokerage fees, even on relatively expensive
odd-lot transactions, rarely exceed 5%, periodic sales are preferable as
long as cash dividends are taxed at a rate exceeding 10%-a condition
which will virtually always be satisfied. Cf. Miller & Modigliani, Some
Estimates of the Cost of Capital to the Electric Utility Industry, 1954-57,
56 AM. ECON. REV. 333, 346 (1966).
There is an additional factor that should influence all investors (in-
dividual, corporate, and tax-exempt) to prefer retained earnings over the
issuance of new securities to finance profitable expansion. There are no
special transaction costs incurred by internal financing with retained earn-
ings. On the other hand, external financing through the sale of new se-
curities requires special registration and underwriting costs. If external
financing is sought, these extra costs will reduce corporate assets and
therefore shareholder wealth. Additional advantages of internal financing
are described by W. BAUMOL, supra note 23, at 75.
30. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1970, at 65, col. 2. Among corporations
offering such plans are AT&T, Dow, Gamble Stores, Stewart Warner, and
Allegheny Power. Brokerage commissions under these plans work out to
as little as 0.07%.
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sufficient to compensate for the tax disadvantages.8 1 A consider-
able amount of empirical work has been performed to test this
hypothesis, but thus far every study has failed to produce any
significant evidence that high payout shares sell at a discount.
Most studies, in fact, have indicated that, instead of selling at a
discount, high payout stock may actually command a premium
in the market relative to low payout stock.3 2 It is important
therefore to explain why high payout stock sells at no discount
in the market despite its significant tax disadvantage. There are
at least two hypotheses that may explain this phenomenon.8 8
C. The Inefficiency Hypothesis
In the real world it is inaccurate to assume, as was done above,
that a dollar of retained earnings always increases common stock
31. By analogy, the interest on corporate bonds suffers from a tax dis-
advantage relative to interest on tax-free municipal bonds. However, cor-
porate bonds sell at a discount relative to municipals, sufficient to com-
pensate for the tax disadvantage for individuals in lower tax brackets.
See B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
176-78 (4th ed. 1972).
32. There is considerable debate over the extent to which high payout
stock commands a premium in the market. Conventional wisdom among
security analysts has given cash dividends up to four times the weight
of retained earnings in valuing common stock. See B. GRAHAM, D. DODD
& S. COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 515-18 (4th ed. 1963). Empirical studies
support the proposition that the market values distributions somewhat
more highly than retentions, although the results do not uphold the view
that distributions are valued four times higher than retentions. R. BREA-
LEY, SECURITY PRICES IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET 16 (1971). One study of
69 electric companies for the years 1958 to 1962 found that retained earn-
ings were weighted less than half as much as dividends by the market
in valuing stock. Brigham & Gordon, Leverage, Dividend Policy, and the
Cost of Capital, 23 J. FIN. 85 (1968). This study, however, was subject
to several important biases that might have exaggerated any market pref-
erence for cash dividends. See R. BREALEY, supra, at 15. A second study
found that the market weighted distributions only 5.3% more than reten-
tions in 1961 and 7.1% more in 1962. Diamond, Earnings Distribution and
the Evaluation of Shares: Some Recent Evidence, 2 J. FIN. & QUANT.
ANAL. 14 (1967). A third study of 300 stocks between 1946 and 1963 can
be interpreted as revealing only a slight positive correlation between mar-
ket value and the proportion of earnings that a company distributed. Ar-
ditti, Risk and Return on Equity, 22 J. FIN. 19 (1967). Other empirical
work is reviewed in R. BREALEY, supra, at 11-21.
33. This article discusses the inefficiency hypothesis and the irrationality
hypothesis. Two other explanations have been offered to explain the non-
existence of a market discount for high payout stock; however, due to
their inherent limits, they deserve only brief mention.
First, it has been suggested that market uncertainty can explain in-
vestor preference for a high cash payout stock.
With perfect markets, the investor always could sell part of his
holdings or re-invest the dividends to satisfy his desire for consump-
tion .... However, with uncertainty, stock prices fluctuate. Cer-
tain investors may regard as unsatisfactory the alternative of selling
a portion of their stock for income at fluctuating prices. As a re-
sult they may have a definite preference for current dividends.
J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 251 (2d ed. 1971)
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values by at least one dollar. Rather, the crucial factor is how the
market evaluates the profit potential of a project in which retained
earnings are reinvested. If the projects chosen are inefficient rela-
tive to investments of comparable risk available in the market, then
the increase in stock values will be less than one dollar for each
dollar of earnings retained. For example, suppose management de-
cides to retain earnings to finance a project that is expected to re-
turn 6 percent and that the market return on stock investments of
comparable risk is 10 percent. Then the market will capitalize the 6
percent return at 10 percent, so that each dollar retained will in-
crease stock values by only 60 cents.
3 4
[hereinafter cited as VAN HORNE]. Other economists, however, have re-
jected this explanation. See R. BREALEY, supra note 23, at 6; J. LoRIE &
M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 121 (1973);
Miller & Modigliani, note 23 supra. Moreover, even if accepted, this uncer-
tainty hypothesis cannot explain why individuals acquire high payout
stock even though they intend to invest cash dividends in additional stock.
Second, the existence of outstanding rights to acquire common stock
(whether in the form of executive stock options, convertible securities, or
simple warrants) may create an incentive for distribution of earnings. If
earnings are retained, the resulting increase in share values must include
a discount for the possible future dilution of shareholder equity on the
-exercise of rights to acquire stock. But if earnings are distributed, only
current stockholders have a right to share in them since the holders of
rights are entitled to cash dividends only if and when their rights are
exercised. In theory, therefore, the value gained by avoiding future dilu-
tion might offset the tax disadvantage when earnings are distributed. In
practice, however, it is doubtful whether value gained by avoiding dilution
is significant enough to have this effect. See W. BAUMOL, supra note 23, at
83-90.
34. It is important to note that management cannot finance an inefficient
project through new equity capital, i.e., by selling additional stock. The
capital market requires a certain level of future prospects from a firm
that applies to it for funds. If the market evaluates a proposed project
as inefficient relative to investments of comparable risk available in the
market, it will not supply the funds. In contrast, management can avoid
the direct discipline of the market by financing projects with retained
earnings. Because of the separation of ownership and control in the large
corporation, the capital market is generally unable to exercise direct influ-
ence over the use of retained earnings. The market's usual reaction to
the use of retained earnings to finance an inefficient project is in the value
it ascribes to the stock in question. This discussion, however, does not
imply that the market will necessarily react unfavorably whenever earn-
ings are retained to finance a project that the market would have refused
to support with new equity capital. See text accompanying notes 33-35
infra.
One explanation offered for the possible inefficient use of retained
earnings is the so-called "sales maximization hypothesis." This hypothesis
supposes that executive salaries are "far more closely correlated with the
scale of operations in the firm than its profitability." See W. BAUMOL,
BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE, AND GROWTH 46 (1959). Therefore, corporate
management will often decide to expand operations with retained earnings
in order to maximize sales and thereby increase executive salaries, despite
the possible inefficiency of expansion. 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR 79-84 (1964); Buchanan, Theory and Practice in
Dividend Distributions, 53 Q.J. ECON. 81 (1938).
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In a world without taxes and transaction costs, shareholders will
always prefer the distribution of earnings over their retention to
finance an inefficient project that increases stock values by less
than one dollar for each dollar invested. Once taxes and transac-
tion costs are introduced, however, investors will only sometimes
prefer distribution over retention of earnings to finance a rela-
tively inefficient project that causes stock values to rise less than
one dollar for each dollar invested .3 Whether any given investor
will, in fact, prefer distribution is a complex question and depends
on a number of factors, the most important of which are the
shareholder's tax bracket and his preference for reinvestment or
consumption of earnings.
To illustrate this, suppose corporate management proposes to
retain earnings to finance a project that will increase stock values
by only 60 cents for each dollar retained. First consider the share-
holder who prefers reinvestment of earnings. One dollar distrib-
uted, net of shareholder ordinary income taxes and brokerage fees
equals (1-t) (1-c) where t is the investor's marginal tax bracket and
c is the percentage brokerage commission. One dollar retained
increases share values by 60 cents, which may be taxed at capital
gains rates in the future when the investor disposes of his stock.
Therefore, one dollar retained, net of future capital gains tax, pro-
duces .60 (1-.5t) / (1+i) n where n is the number of years between the
generation of earnings and the disposition of stock, i is an inter-
est rate to reflect the value of deferral, and .5t is the investor's cap-
ital gains tax rate. In any given year, retention will increase
shareholder wealth more than distribution if .60 (1-.5t) / (1+i)n >
(l-t) (1-c). A simple approximation of this inequality can be ob-
tained by assuming that the investor participates in an automatic
dividend reinvestment plan, so that brokerage fees are de minimis
and that he plans to hold the stock until his death so that all gain
due to retentions escapes taxation. Then retention will increase
shareholder wealth more than distribution if .60 > (l-t), or t > .40.
This result indicates that retention is preferable for the share-
holder who desires reinvestment if his marginal tax bracket ex-
ceeds 40 percent. In that case, the pretax value of retained earn-
ings is less than the pretax value of cash distributions because of
the relative inefficiency of the project financed by the retained
earnings. However, the tax advantage of retention more than off-
sets the value lost due to the inefficiency of reinvestment.
For the investor who desires cash for consumption, the calcula-
'tions are equally complex. One dollar distributed, net of share-
holder ordinary income taxes, equals (-t). The proceeds of selling
stock, net of brokerage fees and capital gains taxes, are .60[(1-c)-
(1-b).5t] where c is the percentage brokerage commission and b is
35. See H. BIERMAN & S. SMIDT, THE CAPITAL 'BUDGETING DECISION 153-55
(1966).
[VOL. 1974:142
NUMBER 1] TAXING STOCK DIVIDENDS AND ECONOMIC THEORY 157
the ratio of the basis to the market value of shares sold. Retentions
are preferable for the investor who desires cash if .60[(l-c)-(l-b)
.5t] > (1-t). To simplify, assume brokerage fees are de minimis
because the investor participates in a collective selling plan and
that the basis is one half the value of shares sold. Retentions are
then preferable if .60 (1-.25t) > (1-t), or t > .47. This result indi-
cates that retention is preferable for the investor who desires cash
if his marginal tax bracket exceeds 47 percent.
This illustration assumes that the rate of return on retained
earnings was 6 percent, or 3/5 of the market return of 10 percent
for investments of comparable risk. Under this condition, reten-
tion will be preferred by investors who desire reinvestment and
whose tax bracket exceeds 40 percent and by investors who prefer
cash and whose tax bracket exceeds 53 percent. If retained earn-
ings were put to more inefficient uses, then the investor's tax
bracket would have to be even higher for the tax advantage of re-
tention to offset the loss in value caused by the inefficiency of re-
investment. For example, if each dollar retained increased stock
values by only 40 cents, then retention will be preferred by share-
holders who desire reinvestment only if their tax bracket exceeds
60 percent and by those who want cash only if their tax bracket
exceeds 67 percent.
The inefficiency of reinvestment hypothesis may therefore explain
why high payout stock does not sell at a discount despite its tax
disadvantage. Empirical testing of the hypothesis, however, has
produced highly ambiguous results. One recent study found an
average rate of return on retained earnings of 3.0 to 4.6 percent,
compared with 14.5 to 20.8 percent on new equity.3 6 These results
confirm the inefficiency hypothesis as an explanation of why high
payout stock fails to sell at a discount in the market. Given the
wide differential in rates of return, the tax advantage of a low pay-
out rate will be offset by the value lost due to the inefficiency of
reinvestment. The validity of these statistical results, however, has
been the subject of considerable debate. A recalculation of the
identical data, under different assumptions, found almost no differ-
ential between the return on retained earnings and the return on
new equity capital.37 The absence of any differential is, of course,
36. Baumol, Helm, Malkiel & Quandt, Earnings Retention, New Capital
and The Growth of the Firm, 52 REV. ECON. & STAT. 345 (1970) [herein-
after cited as BHMQ]. The study compared the average rate of return
on retained earnings with the average rate of return on new equity for
900 industrial corporations from 1946 to 1970.
37. Friend & Husic, Efficiency of Corporate Investment 55 REV. ECON.
& STAT. 122 (1973). The recalculations were performed under two differ-
ent sets of statistical assumptions. The first recalculation produced an av-
erage return of 8.1% on returned earnings versus 14.0% on external eq-
uity. The second recalculation produced an average return of 9.8% to
11.2% on retained earnings and 11.7% to 12.3% on external equity. The
authors of the BHMQ study replied to this critique in Baumol, Helm, Mal-
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inconsistent with and tends to disprove the inefficiency of invest-
ment hypothesis. In view of these conflicting results, it is uncertain
whether the inefficiency hypothesis provides an adequate explana-
tion of market behavior.
D. The Irrationality Hypothesis
A second possible explanation of why high payout stock does
not sell at a discount despite the tax disadvantage is irrational
investor behavior.8  Investors, for example, may be prejudiced
against the invasion of "capital" to fulfill consumption needs.8 9
Appreciation in stock values, even due to retained earnings, may
be perceived as "not-to-be-invaded-capital," while cash distribu-
tions are viewed as "spendable income." This perceptual confu-
sion, however, cannot account for the fact that many investors
acquire high payout stock even though they intend to reinvest cash
distributions in additional stock of the distributing corporation.
To some extent these investors may simply be ignorant of the tax
angle.40  But one financial writer has found that even ignorance
is not an adequate explanation.
[D] ividend income received means capital gains opportun-
kiel & Quandt, Efficiency of Corporate Investment: A Reply, 55 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 128 (1973). See also W. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 76-79 (1965); Whittington, The Profitability of Re-
tained Earnings, 54 REV. ECON. & STAT. 152 (1972).
The BHMQ statistics are consistent with other evidence that corporate
management often reinvests earnings without regard for the efficiency of
their use. After interviewing top officials of 20 major companies in sev-
eral different industries, one author observed,
The net conclusion is that the common practice of these 20 com-
panies with respect to quantitative guides to investment decisions
suggested a cost-free concept of retained earnings for the so-called
mandatory investments in maintaining traditional product lines and
a rough internal opportunity cost standard for "voluntary" invest-
ment opportunities.
G. DONALDSON, CORPORATE DEBT CAPACITY 62 (1961). But see Mendelson,
Payout Policy and Resource Allocation, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 377 (1968).
38. Miller & Modigliani, supra note 23, at 435; Miller & Modigliani,
Some Estimates of the Cost of Capital to the Electric Utility Industry,
1954-57, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 333, 346 (1966).
39. Cf. Mark Twain's statement that "Spending one's capital is feeding
a dog on its own tail." H. PROCHNOW & H. PROCHNOW, JR., A TREASURY
OF HUMOROUS QUOTATIONS 48 (1969). See also R. BREALEY, supra note 23,
at 7; VAN HORNE, supra note 33, at 178-94.
40. One study, conducted by interviewing individuals about their invest-
ment goals, concluded that, except in very high income classes, only a mi-
nority of individuals profess to have taken taxes into account in formu-
lating their investment policies. See J. BUTTERS, L. THOMPSON, & L. BOL-
LINGER, EFFECTS OF TAXATION INVESTMENTS BY INDIVIDUALS 33 (1953). More
recent empirical work, however, shows a significant negative correlation
between stock payout rate and shareholder tax bracket. See Elton & Gru-
ber, Marginal Stockholder Tax Rates and the Clientele Effect, 52 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 68 (1970). This correlation suggests that investors are, to
some extent, influenced by the tax disadvantage of high payout stock.
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ities foregone. Most stock holders will admit the logic of
this case, and will declare themselves unequivocally on
the side of capital gains-in general .... Yet it is a
peculiar fact of life that many stockholders who ac-
knowledge that dividends generally eat into capital gains
will vigorously resist any attempt by their own companies
to cut their dividends; in other words, they will not con-
cede that what is good for them generally is good for them
specifically. 4
1
This observation suggests that some investors, whether they desire
to consume or reinvest earnings, attach a special irrational or sub-
jective significance to a high cash payout per se that is felt to out-
weigh the tax disadvantage. The hypothesis of an irrational pref-
erence for a high cash payout therefore offers an alternative to
the inefficiency of reinvestment hypothesis as an explanation of
why high payout stock sells at no discount in the market despite its
significant tax disadvantage.42
E. Conclusions
In a world that assumes the nonexistence of taxes and transac-
41. Loomis, A Case For Dropping Dividends, 77 FORTUNE, June 15, 1968,
at 183. The market usually reacts unfavorably to any decrease in corpora-
tion payout rates, despite the tax disadvantage of high payout stocks. This
unfavorable reaction, though, may not necessarily be evidence of system-
atic market preference for a high cash payout. It is commonly believed
that corporate dividend policy is used to convey information. Lower divi-
dends, therefore, may be interpreted by the market as signaling manage-
ment's belief that future prospects have deteriorated. See VAN HORNE,
supra note 33, at 250. See also E. SOLOMON, THE THEORY OF FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT 142 (1963). However, one recent study of 310 firms from
1945 to 1968 concluded that "the information content of dividends can only
be trivial," and therefore cannot explain management reluctance to reduce
dividends. Watts, The Information Content of Dividends, 46 J. Bus. 191,
211 (1973).
42. It has been suggested that the irrational preference for a high pay-
out rate may actually reflect rational strategy.
"[I]f an ordinarily rational investor had good reason to believe that
other investors would not behave rationally, then it might well be
rational for him to adopt a strategy he would otherwise have re-jected as irrational."
Once such defensive "irrationality" is recognized as a possibility,
no investor can be expected to have confidence that others will re-
frain from it. . . . Each, on rational grounds, will be motivated to
behave in an "irrational" manner because he knows that others will,
for the same reason, have rational grounds to do so as well.
o . .[I]t seems to be a standard view that shares of low pay-
put companies will sell at a discount . . . . To the extent that this
is the general expectation of security purchasers, even though they
consider it a manifestation of irrationality, they will have no option
but to behave in a manner that makes the prediction come true.
We would then expect that perfectly rational investors would have
no choice but to place a subjective valuation lower than they would
have otherwise on the companies that retain a relatively large per-
centage of their earnings, and that this reasoning would provide its
own justification-the stocks of these companies would sell at a dis-
count as compared with issues paying more generous dividends.
W. BAUMOL, supra note 23, at 56-57.
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tion costs, efficient investment, and rational investor behavior, in-
vestors will be indifferent to the allocation of corporate earnings
between distribution and retention. The real world, however, dif-
fers materially from this theoretical construct. Taxes and trans-
action costs, inefficient reinvestment, and possible irrational pref-
erences cause shareholders to be anything but indifferent to the
allocation of corporate earnings. Since these factors do not influ-
ence all shareholders in the same way, investors prefer a wide range
of cash payout rates.
II. THE EFFECT OF STOCK DIVIDENDS ON INVESTOR
SELECTION OF PAYOUT RATES
This section uses economic theory to analyze the probable conse-
quences of allowing tax-free receipt of pro rata and elective stock
dividends on common stock. Under current law, pro rata stock
dividends are received tax free, and elective stock dividends on
common stock are taxed on receipt as shareholder ordinary income
gain.43 While a significant number of public corporations do issue
pro rata stock dividends, elective stock dividends are virtually
never issued because of this high tax cost.44 Therefore, a crucial
part of the analysis will consist of examining the probable uses of
elective stock dividends if their receipt were permitted tax free.
Since investor demand for retention or distribution of corporate
earnings may, to some undetermined extent, be influenced by ir-
rational investor behavior, the analysis will proceed in two parts.
The effect of tax-free stock dividends on investor cash payout
preferences in a world of rational behavior will be considered first.
The analysis will then be modified to consider tax-free stock divi-
dends in a world of irrational investor behavior.
A. Under the Assumption of Rational Investor Behavior
1. PRO RATA STOCK DIVIDENDS ON COMMON STOCK
Pro rata stock dividends on common stock are issued to reflect
an increase in stock values due to retained earnings. 45 If stock
43. CODE § 305(b) (1).
44. See Loomis, supra note 15, at 184.
45. Usually stock dividends on common are paid in common stock, but
on occasion close corporations may distribute stock dividends in preferred
on common. Under the proportionate interest test, the taxability of this
type of stock dividend turned on whether there was preferred stock out-
standing before the distribution. See note 19 supra. If there was not,
the stock dividend was viewed as tax free because the nature of the share-
holder's interest in value, voting, dividends, and liquidation was un-
changed. Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604 (1943). On the other hand,
if preferred stock was outstanding and if it was not held in the same
proportion as common stock, then the preferred stock dividend altered the
common stockholder's proportionate interest in earnings and assets. This
was considered sufficient to produce the constitutionally required realiza-
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dividends are not issued, this increase in value is reflected by ap-
preciation in the value of shares originally held. Accordingly, a
pro rata common stock dividend on common shares should cause
no change in either the total value or proportionate share of each
stockholder's interest.4" The distribution merely provides each in-
tion. Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937). Under the 1954 Code
all preferred stock dividends paid pro rata on common stock are received
tax free under section 305 (a).
Preferred stock dividends on common have sometimes been issued to bail
out corporate earnings and profits at preferential capital gains rates. See,
e.g., Chamberlain v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 918 (1954). If the preferred stock is callable, it may be sold to a
third party who resells it to the issuing corporation. This scheme attempts
to disguise a cash dividend as a stock dividend followed by a sale allowing
the investor preferential capital gain treatment. Since the stock dividend
is a disguised cash distribution, rather than a symbol of cash retained,
its taxation should be distinguished from taxation of undistributed and
reinvested earnings. Although a pro rata dividend of preferred stock on
common may, at present, be received tax free under section 305 (a), section
306 now imposes an ordinary income tax on most sales of preferred stock
dividends in order to thwart this scheme. See BITTKER & EusTIcE, supra
note 3, ch. 10.
Because close corporation stock is not readily marketable, it will be
the unusual case where a shareholder is able to find an outside party will-
ing to purchase preferred stock for a bona fide investment (as opposed
to the bail-out where the third party is a conduit and not a genuine in-
vestor). This rarity, therefore, probably justifies imposing an ordinary in-
come tax on the sale of all preferred stock dividends on common on the
ground that they are almost certainly being used to disguise a cash distri-
bution. Section 306 imposes a shareholder ordinary income tax on all such
sales with the exception of dispositions that produce a substantial termina-
tion of the investor's interest.
In the unusual case where a sale to a bona fide investor is contem-
plated, the sale of a preferred stock dividend enables the shareholder to
obtain cash at capital gains rates by transferring part of his interest with-
out a dilution of rights to residual values and control that would accom-
pany a sale of part of his common stock. If the investor had no pre-
ferred stock to sell, he might be unwilling to dilute his residual and vot-
ing rights to obtain cash at capital gains rates and so would be more likely
to prefer a cash distribution by the corporation. This reasoning may jus-
tify taxing all sales of close corporation preferred stock received as a divi-
dend on common, whether bona fide or not.
It should be asked at this point how a bona fide sale of preferred
stock received as a dividend on common differs from preferred stock issued
to common stockholders on initial incorporation. The sale of the latter
stock does not result in ordinary income taxation under section 306. This
differential tax treatment may be explained by the fact that preferred
stock outstanding from the time of incorporation is likely to have received
annual cash dividends taxable at ordinary income rates. On the other
hand, where only common stock is outstanding from initial incorporation,
it is less likely that any significant cash distributions on stock will have
been made and more likely that a preferred stock dividend is a device to
bail out corporate earnings at capital gains rates.
46. The pro rata common stock dividend on common stock is consid-
ered the classic example of the nontaxable stock dividend under the reali-
zation test because the shareholder's interest is changed only nominally,
being exactly the same as it was before, except for the absolute number
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vestor with a larger absolute number of shares and additional
pieces of paper. Therefore, if investors behave in a rational man-
ner, pro rata stock dividends on common stock should not affect
investor preferences for cash payout.
2. ELECTIVE STOCK DIVIDENDS ON COMMON STOCK
A tax-free elective stock dividend, like a pro rata stock dividend,
will not affect investor preferences for high versus low cash pay-
out. Yet if tax-free treatment were permitted, elective stock divi-
dends might become important as a method by which a corporation
may offer shareholders a choice of two or more cash payout rates
on its common stock. Unless elective stock dividends are issued,
a corporation must offer all its common shareholders the same
cash payout rate.47 To illustrate, assume that a corporation al-
lows each shareholder to vary the allocation of earnings per share
between distribution and retention. It is almost inevitable that
some shareholders will elect less cash and more retention per share
than others. Those who elect more retention per share should
end up with a larger proportionate interest in the corporation than
those who take more cash.48 This, in turn, will require the dis-
tribution of additional stock to shareholders electing retention to
reflect their proportionately greater interests. In contrast, when a
corporation pays the same cash dividend per share of common,
there is no change in any shareholder's proportionate interest that
would require the distribution of additional stock. Elective stock
dividends thus enable a corporation to offer its common sharehold-
ers a choice of cash payout rates.49
of shares and pieces of paper. See note 19 supra. Under present law,
such stock dividends are received tax free. See CODE § 305(a).
47. However, on rare occasions, a controlling interest may waive its
right to receive cash dividends without receiving a stock dividend in lieu
of cash. See Rev. Proc. 67-14, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 591; B. GRAHAM, D. DODD
& S. COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 495-96 (4th ed. 1963).
48. Compare this analysis with the language of section 305(b) (2), pro-
viding that a stock dividend is taxable when it results in "(A) the receipt
of property by some shareholders, and (B) an increase in the proportionate
interests of other shareholders in the assets or earnings and profits of the
corporation."
49. The taxation of the receipt of elective stock dividends as shareholder
ordinary income gain deters their use by closely-held corporations. There-
fore, taxing elective stock dividends, in effect, is the functional equivalent
of a requirement that a close corporation maintain only one rate of cash
payout on its common stock. However, this requirement will not gener-
ally affect the ability of close corporation investors to obtain a low rate
of cash payout. If the close corporation common is owned by one person,
the requirement is irrelevant since the corporation can vary the one payout
rate to suit his preferences. Where there is more than one common stock-
holder, the one cash payout rate will reflect a compromise among the own-
ers. If a controlling block of shareholders favors low cash dividends and
the compromise reflects this preference, then the requirement of one cash
payout rate does not affect the ability of investors to obtain a low rate
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The ability to choose between two different cash payout rates
on a single corporation's common stock makes it substantially
cheaper for an investor to alter the cash payout rate on his stock
portfolio. 50 When no election is available, an investor can alter
the payout rate only by changing the stocks in his portfolio. The
sale and purchase transactions require payment of a capital gains
tax and brokerage fees. The election, on the other hand, avoids
the capital gains tax and brokerage fee barriers to portfolio -ad-
justment and allows an investor to alter the payout rate at no cost
simply by changing his election.
The elimination of barriers to portfolio adjustment is important
for two reasons. First, without barriers to adjustment, investors
will alter their cash payout rates with greater frequency. Em-
pirical studies have demonstrated a negative correlation between
of cash payout. It is only when a controlling block of investors favors
a high rate of cash payout that the compromise rate will limit the ability
of minority shareholders to obtain a low rate of cash payout. The taxa-
tion of elective stock dividends is therefore an ineffective and arbitrary
method of regulating shareholder demand for the preferential treatment
accorded retained earnings in the close corporation.
50. In addition, an election permitting a choice of stock dividend in ei-
ther common or preferred may be used to transfer residual interests from
retiring to active participants in a close corporation. Assume, for example,
that father and son each are employed by and own 50% of the common
stock of X Corporation. The father plans to retire and wishes to obtain
a source of cash income to replace his salary, while the son will remain
active in the business and have sufficient cash income provided by his
salary. To satisfy both, X Corporation might issue a dividend of preferred
stock to the father and of common stock to the son. The corporation will
then pay the father regular cash dividends on his preferred while main-
taining a low cash dividend rate on the common. This transaction does
not involve a disguised cash distribution since the father is simply switch-
ing a part of his investment from a residual equity to a preferred interest.
In the absence of stock dividends, X Corporation must pay all common
shares the same cash dividend reflecting a compromise between the prefer-
ences of father and son. Under this condition, cash dividends on all com-
mon shares will rise on the father's retirement due to his increased prefer-
ence for cash. The election to be paid a stock dividend in preferred on
common avoids this result by allowing the father to transform his common
stock into cash-dividend-paying preferred. This may cause lower cash div-
idends to be paid to both father and son than in the absence of the elec-
tion.
Until 1969 preferred stock dividends on common used to transfer re-
sidual interests were received tax free in order to facilitate major shifts
in the control of closely-held businesses. See Marjorie N. Dean, 10 T.C.
19 (1948). Since the 1969 Tax Reform Act, however, the picture is less
clear. Section 305 (b) (3) now provides for ordinary income taxation of
distributions that result in "the receipt of preferred stock by some common
shareholders, and (B) the receipt of common stock by other common
shareholders." Although section 305 (b) (3) literally applies to our father-
son hypothetical, there is evidence that Congress intended to suspend its
application when stock dividends are used to shift residual interests from
retiring to active investors. See 115 CONG. REc. 37902 (1969) (remarks
of Senator Russell Long in response to a question by Senator Aiken).
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the payout rate chosen and an investor's tax bracket.5' This means
that the desire to obtain a lower payout rate is correlated with a
higher tax bracket and, conversely, that a desire to maintain a
higher payout rate is correlated with a lower tax bracket. There-
fore, the lowering of barriers to adjustment will tend to increase
the concentration of low payout stock among high bracket inves-
tors and high payout stock among low bracket investors. This,
in turn, will cause a decrease in the aggregate rate at which all
cash dividends are taxed. Second, the existence of a costless elec-
tion also influences the effective tax rate on retained earnings.
Because an adjustment in a portfolio's cash payout rate can be ac-
complished without selling stock, the time interval between the
generation of earnings and the disposition of stock will tend to
increase. As this interval grows, taxation is deferred with a cor-
responding decline in the effective rate at which retained earnings
are taxed.
3. TAXING STOCK DIVIDENDS: THE IMPACT ON INVESTORS
The preceding discussion indicates that in a world in which in-
vestors behave rationally and stock dividends on common stock
are not taxed, elective stock dividends may affect shareholder tax-
ation in two ways. First, they may decrease the aggregate tax
rate on cash dividends by lowering the barriers to portfolio adjust-
51. A recent study by Elton & Gruber, Marginal Stockholder Tax Rates
and the Clientele Effect, 52 REV. ECON. & STAT. 68 (1970) hypothesized
that the lower a firm's cash payout rate, the smaller the percentage of
total return that a stockholder expects to receive in the form of dividends
and the larger the percentage he expects to receive in the form of capital
gains. Thus, the high payout firm should attract stockholders in relatively
lower tax brackets than the low payout firms. To test this hypothesis,
data was collected on the behavior of stock prices on ex-dividend dates
for all stock on the New York Stock Exchange that paid dividends during
the period April 1, 1966 to March 31, 1967. Ex-dividend behavior permitted
indirect study of the correlation between payout rate and tax bracket since
[a] stockholder selling stock before a stock goes ex-dividend loses
the right to the already declared dividend. If he sells the stock
on the ex-dividend day he retains the dividend but should expect
to sell it at a lower price (because of this dividend retention). In
a rational market the fall in price on the ex-dividend day should
reflect the value of dividends vis-A-vis capital gains to the marginal
stockholders. . . . [Thus] one can infer marginal stockholder tax
brackets from observing the ex-dividend behavior of common stocks.
Id. at 69. The results showed a significant negative correlation between
payout rate and tax bracket. Earlier studies had produced inconclusive
results. See J. BRITTAIN, CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY 45 (1966). See also
T. ATKINSON, THE PATTERN OF FINANCIAL ASSET OWNERSHIP (1956); J.
BUTTERS, L. THOMPSON, & L. BOLLINGER, EFFECTS OF TAXATION INVESTMENTS
BY INDIVIDUALS (1953); E. Cox, TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF STOCK
OWNERSHIP (1963); D. HOLLAND, DIVIDENDS UNDER THE INCOME TAX 38-39
(1962); Crum, Analysis of Stock Ownership, 31 HARV. Bus. REV. 36 (1953);
Shoup, Taxation of Dividends, in 3 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1537-38 (Comm. Print
1969).
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ment, thereby increasing the concentration of cash dividends
among lower income investors. Second, tax-free elective stock
dividends may also reduce the effective tax rate on retained earn-
ings by tending to postpone the disposition of stock. Taxation of
elective stock dividends on receipt, as under present law, prevents
any loss in revenue resulting from either of these rate reduc-
tions. Because of this high tax cost under present law, elective
stock dividends are virtually never issued. Therefore, stock port-
folios can only be adjusted through market transactions that re-
quire payment of a possible capital gains tax and brokerage fees.
It is obviously not necessary, however, to tax elective stock divi-
dends at ordinary income rates in order to use the capital gains tax
as a barrier to adjustment and to maintain the effective tax rate on
retained earnings. Both goals could be achieved by the less drastic
means of allowing tax-free receipt of elective stock dividends and
treating the shareholder who changes his election as if he had
sold the stock and imposing a capital gains tax on that occasion.
If this proposal were enacted, the only remaining difference be-
tween elective stock dividends and market transactions as methods
of portfolio adjustment would then be that the investor would in-
cur brokerage fees if adjustment occurs through market sales and
purchases. When contrasted with this proposal, the extra effect of
the current scheme of taxing stock dividends is to maintain brok-
erage fees as a barrier to portfolio adjustment.
From the standpoint of revenue, it probably makes little differ-
ence whether a change in election is treated as a sale of stock or
whether elective stock dividends are taxed, which is to say whether
brokerage fees are eliminated or maintained as a barrier to ad-
justment. It is true that without brokerage fees, adjustment will
tend to occur with greater frequency, causing a decrease in the
aggregate tax rate on cash dividends. But adjustment would still
require payment of a capital gains tax, and greater frequency of
adjustment would mean an offsetting increase in the effective rate
of tax on stock gains.
From the standpoint of equity, however, it does matter whether
brokerage fees are eliminated or maintained as a barrier to adjust-
ment. Since brokerage fees are a decreasing percentage of the dol-
lar amount traded, they burden smaller investors more than larger
investors.5 2 Therefore, since taxing elective stock dividends as or-
dinary income gain maintains brokerage fees as a barrier to port-
folio adjustment, it is an inequitable method of taxation when
compared with treating a change in election as a sale of stock.
52. The commission charges set by the New York and American Stock
Exchanges for "odd lot" transactions are a decreasing function of the dollar
amount involved; therefore, transaction costs per dollar invested will be
larger for smaller amounts. STANDARD & PooR, STOCK GUIDE 225 (1973).
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
B. Under the Assumption of Irrational Investor Behavior
1. PRO RATA STOCK DIVIDENDS ON COMMON STOCK
If investors behaved in a rational manner, pro rata stock divi-
dends on common stock would not influence investor preferences
for high versus low cash payout stock. In the real world, however,
a significant number of corporations do issue pro rata stock divi-
dends on common to attempt to influence investor preferences for
cash payout.5 38 Corporate management apparently believes that
stock dividends will increase the attractiveness of a low rate of
cash payout.5 4 Some investors, for example, may be reluctant to
fulfill consumption needs by selling stock because they view such
action as an "invasion of capital." They may perceive stock divi-
dends as "spendable income" and therefore be less reluctant to sell
them to obtain cash, whereas appreciation in shares originally held
may still be perceived as "not-to-be-invaded capital."'5 5 Moreover,
whether they prefer to consume or reinvest earnings, shareholders
may attach a subjective or nonrational importance to dividends
in stock similar to that attached to dividends in cash. In other
words, a payout consisting of a dividend in stock may satisfy their
irrational preference for stock offering a high payout.
It is difficult to evaluate the belief that stock dividends have
these effects since it has received virtually no empirical testing.
If the proposition were generally true, corporations would be ex-
pected to issue stock dividends to reflect any and all earnings re-
tained for reinvestment. Since most corporations do not issue reg-
ular stock dividends, the proposition may be unsupported con-
jecture. The fact remains, however, that a significant number of
corporations do issue pro rata stock dividends on common on a
regular basis.56 Furthermore, since a large corporation's expenses
in issuing stock dividends can amount to several hundred thousand
dollars,5 7 it is unlikely that stock dividends would be issued with-
out the expectation that investors will be affected in some way.58
Therefore, at least in some circumstances, stock dividends are ex-
53. See note 15 supra.
54. E. DONALDSON & J. PFAHL, CORPORATE FINANCE 619 (2d ed. 1963).
"[S]hareholders expect to receive dividends when there are earnings. In
the event the company has used or needs the money in the business, it
can retain the money and still pay a stock dividend. In this way the
shareholder is pacified." Id. See also H. GUTHMANN & H. DOUGALL, COR-
PORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 526 (3d ed. 1955).
55. VAN HORNE, supra note 33, at 275; Smith, Tax Treatment of Divi-
dends, in 3 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1548 (Comm. Print 1959).
56. See note 15 supra.
57. R. BREALEY, supra note 23, at 62. Some financial writers have sug-
gested that stock dividends may be used to convey information. However,
a recent empirical study casts substantial doubt on this view. See Watts,
note 41 supra.
58. See note 54 supra.
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pected to affect shareholder preferences for high versus low cash
payout. To the extent that this expectation is justified, pro rata
stock dividends on common influence investors to demand port-
folios with a lower average rate of cash payout than they would in
their absence.
2. ELECTIVE STOCK DIVIDENDS ON COMMON STOCK
A dividend payable at the shareholder's election in cash or in
stock would affect investors in three ways. First, as explained in
the section assuming rational behavior, the election would lower
barriers to the adjustment of portfolio cash payout rates. Second,
elective stock dividends, like pro rata stock dividends, may increase
the attractiveness for investors of low cash payout stock. Third,
elective stock dividends permit investors to receive a low cash pay-
out while holding stock that offers the option of receiving a high
cash payout. To the extent that this arrangement satisfies the ir-
rational preference for high cash payout stock, investors will ac-
quire stock offering elective stock dividends and elect to receive
stock as a substitute for demanding a high rate of cash payout.
It is probable that tax-free elective stock dividends would be an
especially attractive substitute for investors who participate in
automatic dividend reinvestment plans.59 Instead of directing the
corporation to deposit cash dividends with a bank for the acquisi-
tion of additional stock, investors could direct the corporation to
retain earnings for internal reinvestment and to forward a stock
dividend to reflect earnings retained. However, to the extent the
preference for cash payout is explained by the inefficiency hy-
pothesis, internal reinvestment will not be an acceptable substi-
tute for using cash dividends to acquire stock in the market.
3. TAXING STOCK DIVIDENDS UNDER THE IRRATIONALITY
HYPOTHESIS: THE IMPACT ON INVESTORS
The preceding discussion indicates that under the irrationality hy-
pothesis, stock dividends, if received tax free, may influence in-
vestors to demand portfolios with a lower average rate of cash
payout. This increased demand will tend to cause an increase in
the proportion of corporate earnings retained and sheltered from
shareholder ordinary income taxation. Taxation of stock divi-
dends, both pro rata and elective, therefore, might be justified as
a means of limiting shareholder demand for retained earnings.
If this is the justification for taxation however, the tax falls un-
evenly on shareholders with different preferences. The extent to
which an individual's investment earnings are sheltered from or-
dinary income taxation is directly related to the proportion of
earnings retained. Stock dividend taxation, by its nature, does not
59. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
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focus on this proportion. Rather, taxation focuses on a device
that may influence some investors to demand portfolios with a
lower rate of cash payout. For example, when all stock dividends
are taxed, a low cash payout rate will be less attractive to investors
who attribute some subjective or irrational importance to stock
dividends. But taxation will not affect investors who are satisfied
with a low cash payout rate in the absence of stock dividends.
Therefore unless there is some virtue to penalizing only investors
with irrational preferences, taxing stock dividends seems a curious
way to limit the proportion of corporate earnings retained and
sheltered from shareholder ordinary income taxes.
III. STOCK DIVIDENDS AND CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY
Corporate management has the legal power to allocate corporate
profits between distribution and retention." In the absence of
elective stock dividends, a given corporation can offer only one
cash payout rate on its common stock.0 ' This payout rate should
attract common stockholders with similar cash payout prefer-
ences. 62 Moreover, once attracted, they will oppose any reduction
in the corporate payout rate unless their individual preferences
change.0 3 To compensate for the lower payout rate, shareholders
would have to engage in market transactions to alter the compo-
sition of their investment portfolios. Since this alteration may
entail the payment of capital gains tax and brokerage fees, share-
holders will oppose a payout reduction. Furthermore, manage-
60. Factors such as the depreciation allowance, cash flow, and interest
rates are important determinants of a given corporation's dividend policy.
For a summary of empirical studies of corporate dividend policy see R.
BREALEY, supra note 23, at 4-33. Major studies include J. BRITTAIN, COR-
PORATE DIVIDEND POLICY (1966); S. DOBROVOLSKY, CORPORATE INCOME RE-
TENTION, 1915-43 (1951); R. GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX (1951);
Lintner, Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained
Earnings, and Taxes, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 97 (May 1956) (Papers and
Proceedings).
61. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
62. In their seminal article on dividend theory, Modigliani and Miller
predicted that a given payout rate would attract investors with similar
cash payout preferences. Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corpo-
rate Finances and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
Other financial theorists have expressed agreement with this proposition.
See, e.g., H. BIERMAN & S. SMIDT, supra note 35, at 155; Elton & Gruber,
supra note 40, at 68.
63. Stated differently, this means that investors prefer corporations that
maintain stable dividend rates. The view that corporate management
should pursue a stable dividend policy has been frequently expressed in
corporate finance literature. See, e.g., H. GTJTHMANN & H. DOUGALL, COR-
PORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 528-29 (1955). Two empirical studies indicate that
management generally takes this advice. See generally G. DONALDSON,
CORPORATE DEBT CAPACITY (1961); Lintner, Distribution of Incomes of Cor-
porations Among Dividends, Retained Earnings, and Taxes, 46 AM. ECON.
REV. 97 (May 1956) (Papers and Proceedings).
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ment may be reluctant to reduce cash dividends because a change
in dividend rate is often viewed as conveying management's opin-
ion of future prospects.6 4 The market, for example, may view a
fall in dividends as signalling a cloud on the corporate horizon
and react by assigning a lower value to the corporation's stock.
As the following discussion indicates, however, shareholders may
be more willing to accept a lower payout rate, and a reduction in
cash dividends may convey a different message, when stock div-
idends are issued.6 5
64. See, e.g., R. BREALEY, supra note 23, at 20; A. ROBICHEK & S. MYERS,
supra note 23, at 55; Thompson & Walsh, Companies Stress Dividend Con-
sistency, 25 MANAGEMENT RECORD 30 (Jan. 1963). Whether this market
perception is justified is difficult to test empirically because a determina-
tion of management's opinion of the future in connection with each divi-
dend policy change must be made. For one attempt, see Darling, A Sur-
rogative Measure of Business Confidence and Its Relation to Stock Prices,
10 J. FIN. 442 (1955). Moreover, one recent empirical study casts doubt
on the thesis that dividends convey information. See Watts, note 41 supra.
65. Although this article focuses on stock dividends and common stock,
some general observations concerning preferred stock and corporate divi-
dend policy should be noted. Preferred stock is issued with dividend and
liquidation rights that are limited but have priority over the residual open-
ended rights of common stock See generally B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S.
COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 375-83 (4th ed. 1963). Preferred stock is ac-
quired by investors who prefer a secure but limited flow of cash dividends.
Preferred stockholders, therefore, actively resist attempts to replace their
dividend in cash with a dividend in stock. H. GUTHMANN & H. DOUGALL,
CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 528 (1955). However, their resistance may
be tempered when stock dividends on preferred are issued to resolve a
corporate deadlock that has interrupted the payment of all cash dividends
on both preferred and common stock. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, COR-
PORATE FINANCE 157-239 (1972).
Preferred stockholders receive cash dividends only when management,
usually representing common stock, votes to pay them, and management
cannot legally pay dividends on common until the prior dividend rights
of preferred are satisfied in full. Therefore, if management desires to pay
dividends on common, there is a powerful incentive to vote regular cash
dividends on preferred. This incentive is diminished, however, when the
corporation has been unable to pay preferred cash dividends and arrear-
ages have accumulated on the preferred. Arrearages may be so large that
their satisfaction would require all available cash for many years. Since
common stock can then be paid a dividend only after many years, there
is little incentive to pay anything on the preferred at all. The result is
a deadlock in which management is unwilling to pay cash dividends on
preferred and therefore unable to pay them on common.
This quandary can be resolved by offering the preferred stockholders
additional equity interests in lieu of cash in satisfaction of their arrearage
rights. If accepted, the arrearages are wiped out, and only current pre-
ferred cash dividends need be satisfied before paying dividends on common
stock. Thus, once again there is a powerful incentive for management
to vote cash dividends on preferred. Preferred shareholders will obviously
find this arrangement more acceptable if stock dividends are received tax
free. Unless the deadlock is broken, there is little prospect of cash divi-
dends ever being paid by the corporation. Therefore, tax-free stock divi-
dends, in satisfaction of large arrearages, may cause an increase in cash
distributed and actually reduce the retention of corporate earnings.
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A. The Use of Stock Dividends to Achieve a
Lower Cash Payout Rate
Investors may be less inclined to oppose a decrease in cash pay-
out when it is accompanied by the issuance of a pro rata or an
elective stock dividend. If the assumption of irrational behavior is
correct, some investors may view the stock dividend as "spend-
able income" comparable to cash. Moreover, while a decrease in
cash dividends alone may signal gloomy prospects, the addition of
a stock dividend or the opportunity to receive a stock dividend may
be interpreted as conveying the message that management still
regards the future as rosy.66
The elective stock dividend offers an additional advantage. The
elective stock dividend, unlike a cash dividend on common, enables
a corporation to maintain two or more cash payout rates on its
common stock. To illustrate the importance of this, suppose cor-
porate management discovers an attractive investment opportunity
that it wishes to finance with retained earnings by decreasing its
cash payout rate. In the absence of stock dividends, this would re-
quire lowering the cash payout rate on common across the board,
but a significant number of shareholders who prefer the current
rate will oppose this reduction, and their opposition will often
succeed. If, instead, the corporation offers shareholders the choice
between receiving cash dividends at the current rate or equity
appreciation in the form of stock dividends, shareholder opposition
may be diminished. The election will enable the corporation to
reduce its cash dividends, without encountering opposition, to the
extent that some shareholders prefer the lower cash payout rate.
Moreover, even if none of the corporation's current shareholders
elect the lower cash payout rate, the ability to receive stock divi-
dends in lieu of cash will make its stock attractive to an entirely
new clientele with lower cash payout preferences. As these new
purchasers acquire its shares and elect to receive dividends in
stock, the corporation will be able to retain funds in greater vol-
ume.
Arrangements with the effect, if not the appearance, of elective
stock dividends0 7 may also facilitate certain corporate acquisitions. 8
Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, all stock dividends paid on
preferred are taxable at ordinary income rates. CODE § 305(b) (4). There
is virtually no explanation of this provision in the congressional reports
other than the statement that its purpose is to halt "an obvious tax avoid-
ance technique."
66. VAN HORNE, supra note 33, at 276. See also B. GRAHAM, D. DODD
& S. CoTTLE, SECURITY ANALYsIs 499 (4th ed. 1963); H. GUTHMANN & H.
DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 524 (3d ed. 1955).
67. See the articles cited in note 3 supra; Levin, Corporate Adjustments,
in A PRACTITIONER's GUIDE TO THE TAX REFORM ACT or 1969, at 29 (1970)
(Practising Law Institute); and Levin, Principal Effects of the Tax Reform
Act of 1969 On Corporations, 52 CHI. B. RECORD 25, 35-39 (1970).
68. See Loomis, A Case for Dropping Dividends, 77 FORTUNE, June 15,
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For example, suppose X Corp. proposes to acquire Z Corp. for X
common stock. If X common has a low cash payout rate, the
owners of Z corp. may find the offer unattractive. To overcome
their reluctance and maintain a low cash payout rate on its original
common, X Corp. might offer the Z shareholders a new class of X
common with a high cash dividend rate. It should be noted that
this arrangement requires the distribution of regular stock divi-
dends on the original X common to compensate for the difference
in amount of cash dividends on the two classes of common stock.
B. Taxing Stock Dividends: The Impact on Corporations
Taxation of elective stock dividends imposes a penalty suffi-
cient to deter their use by management in setting corporate divi-
dend policy. In the first place, taxation creates a barrier to corpo-
rate acquisitions that depend on arrangements designed to furnish
two different cash payout rates on the stock of the acquiring cor-
poration. 69 More importantly, taxation makes it more difficult for
a corporation to increase its retained earnings through a reduction
of its cash payout rate. This latter difficulty illustrates the dis-
criminatory impact of stock dividend taxation on corporate capac-
ity to retain earnings and shelter shareholder gains from ordinary
income taxation.
As noted above, the extent to which a corporation shelters earning
from shareholder ordinary income taxation is directly related to
the proportion of earnings retained, but stock dividend taxation
does not focus on this proportion. The taxation burden falls in-
stead on the use of stock dividends to increase the rate of retention
without regard to the actual proportion of earnings retained. For
example, taxation will deter a corporation that retains a low pro-
portion of its earnings from raising its retention rate by issuing
stock dividends. In contrast, taxation will not affect companies
that began with a "growth" character and have always retained a
high proportion of earnings. Rather than limiting the extent to
which any given corporation can be used to retain earnings to its
shareholders' tax advantage, stock dividend taxation discriminates
against companies that began with a "non-growth" character and
later, with the possibility of profitable investment, desire to ex-
1968, at 180; Ray, Stock Dividends: Section 305(b) and the Conglomerates,
U. So. CAL. 1969 TAX INsT. 341; Metzer, The Impact of Section 306 Upon
Convertible Preferred Stock Issued in a Corporate Reorganization, 116 U.
PA. L. REV. 755 (1968).
69. See Eustice, The Tax Reform Act of 1969: Corporations and Corpo-
rate Investors, 25 TAx L. REv. 509, 542 (1969). Viewed in this light, the
taxation of elective stock dividends might be justified as a deterrent to
conglomerate mergers. The problem with this justification, however, is
that the Code does not restrict taxation to elective stock dividends issued
in connection with conglomerate acquisitions. In addition, even if there
were such a limitation, questions about the propriety of using tax policy
as a surrogate for the enforcement of the antitrust laws would remain.
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pand more rapidly.70
IV. CONCLUSION
Under present law, an elective stock dividend is treated as pro-
ducing shareholder ordinary income gain while a pro rata stock
dividend on common stock is accorded tax-free treatment. Since
a stock dividend, whether elective or not, does not distribute as-
sets out of corporate solution, taxing any stock dividend ap-
pears inconsistent with the basic tax distinction between retained
and distributed corporate earnings. Moreover, neither the doc-
trine of constructive receipt nor the proportionate interest test
justifies taxation of elective stock dividends as if assets were dis-
tributed from the corporation. This article has used economic the-
ory to analyze the relationship between stock dividends and share-
holder taxation in a hypothetical world that grants tax-free treat-
ment to all stock dividends, both pro rata and elective.
On the basis of this analysis, several conclusions can be stated.
First, the central problem in the economics of dividends is why
high payout stock sells at no discount in the market despite its
significant tax disadvantage. In the financial literature, two major
hypotheses have been advanced to explain this phenomenon. One
theory posits that the tax advantage of low payout stock may be
offset by inefficient reinvestment of retained earnings by corpo-
rate management. Since the validity of the inefficiency hypothesis
is uncertain, theorists have ventured a second hypothesis; namely,
that investors have an irrational preference for high payout stock.
Fortunately, an analysis of stock dividends and investor prefer-
ences can be performed without verifying either theory simply by
analyzing the effect of tax-free stock dividends on investment
preferences assuming first that investors behave rationally and
then that they behave irrationally.
Second, the effect of tax-free stock dividends on investor demand
70. This discrimination presents especially serious consequences for the
public utility industry, faced with increased needs for capital funds to meet
the energy crisis and federal and state antipollution requirements. Since
it is less expensive to finance expansion with retained earnings, these com-
panies have attempted to use elective stock dividends to lower cash divi-
dends and increase reinvestment of earnings. Since elective stock divi-
dends are taxed, these companies are less able to reduce cash dividends
and more likely to seek financing through the sale of new securities. See,
e.g., B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 492, 500-01 (4th
ed. 1963); Smith, supra note 55, at 1549. See also Lee, The Stock Divi-
dend, 37 TAXES 959, 970-71 & n.71 (1959); Leist, Efforts to Tax Stock Divi-
dends Under Section 305 Opposed: Experts Differ, 11 J. TAXATION 70, 71
(1959); Tax Planning & Business Management Dept., IRS Attempts to Stop
2-Classes-of-Common-Tax-Saving Plan; Legality Questioned, 5 J. TAXA-
TION 178 (1956); Tax Planning & Business Management Dept., Two Classes
of Stock: One Gets Cash, One Stock Dividends; A Useful Tax Planning
Tool, 4 J. TAXATION 312 (1956).
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for retention or distribution of corporate earnings depends upon
whether investors are influenced by irrational preferences. If in-
vestors behave rationally, tax-free stock dividends on publicly-held
common stock will not affect shareholder demand for retention or
distribution of corporate earnings. If, on the other hand, investors
behave irrationally, tax-free stock dividends make a low cash pay-
out rate more attractive and tend to increase the proportion of
earnings retained by the corporation.
Third, if the irrationality hypothesis is accurate taxing stock divi-
dends might be justified as a means of limiting the sheltering of
corporate earnings from shareholder ordinary income taxes. How-
ever, taxation would affect only those investors for whom stock
dividends have some subjective or irrational importance. Those
investors who are satisfied with a low cash payout in the absence
of stock dividends would not be affected.
Fourth, whether investors behave rationally or irrationally, elec-
tive stock dividends on publicly-held common, if accorded tax-free
treatment, eliminate the capital gains tax and brokerage fees as
barriers to the adjustment of a portfolio's cash payout rate. This
elimination of barriers may, to some undetermined extent, de-
crease the effective rates at which both cash distributions and re-
tained earnings are taxed. It is possible, however, to avoid any
reduction in revenue that tax-free elective stock dividends might
cause by treating the shareholder who changes his election as if
he sold his stock and imposing a capital gains tax on that occasion.
Compared with this alternative, the present method of taxing elec-
tive stock dividends as ordinary income gain has an inequitable
impact on investors because the effect of present law is to maintain
brokerage fees as a barrier to portfolio adjustment and broker-
age fees burden smaller investors more than larger investors.
Finally, at the corporate level, taxing stock dividends on publicly-
held common deters the use of stock dividends to increase the
proportion of earnings retained for reinvestment. Taxation, there-
fore, will not affect "growth companies" that retain a high propor-
tion of earnings wihout paying stock dividends and will discrimi-
nate against companies that began with a "non-growth" character
and later desire to expand more rapidly.
These conclusions indicate that taxing stock dividends has an in-
equitable impact on the ability of both investors and corporations
to shelter retained earnings from shareholder ordinary income
taxes. If there is legitimate concern about the preferential treat-
ment afforded retained earnings, then the preference should be
attacked in a comprehensive manner that affects all shareholders
and all corporations. While thorough evaluation of the methods
of reducing the preferential treatment of retained earnings is be-
yond the scope of this paper, two possibilities deserve brief men-
tion.
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An administratively convenient method of eliminating the re-
tained earnings tax preference would be to impose a corporate-
level tax on retained earnings that exceed a certain percentage
of the year's profits. This proposal differs from the present ac-
cumulated earnings tax that is restricted to the retained earnings
of closely-held corporations that exceed reasonable business
needs.7'1 An across the board accumulated earnings tax would
obviously affect the degree to which all shareholders and all cor-
porations shelter retained earnings. The threat of such a tax may
cause the distribution of corporate earnings with the imposition of
a shareholder ordinary income tax on the amount distributed. If
corporate earnings are distributed, the tax burden will be progres-
sive, varying among shareholders as a function of individual tax
rates. But if the threat fails to cause distribution, the accumulated
earnings tax would be imposed at the corporate level with a pro-
portional burden on all common stockholders of a given corpora-
tion.
A more progressive tax proposal would impose a heavier tax on
retained earnings directly at the shareholder level. The current
shareholder tax rate on retained earnings is a function of: the tax
rate applied to appreciation in the value of stock; the time interval
between the generation and taxation of retained earnings; and
whether the shareholder holds the stock until his death so that a
stepped-up basis is granted by section 1014 (a).72 Instead of taxing
stock dividends, the effective rate of tax on retained earnings could
be increased by altering the above factors individually or in ap-
propriate combination. Section 1014(a) could be repealed,7 3 and
the tax rate applied to stock gains could be increased.7 4 Finally,
in order to shorten the time interval between generation and tax-
ation of retained earnings, stock appreciation could be taxed at
regular intervals, whether the stock is sold or not, with gain
measured by the public market value of the stock.75 This second
71. See BrrTKER, supra note 3, ch. 8.
72. See text accompanying notes 8-11 supra.
73. This change was unsuccessfully proposed by the Treasury in 1963.
See Hearings on H.R. 8362 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 47-52 (1963).
74. Any increase in the capital gains rate will tend to increase rigidity
in capital markets. See NEw YORK STOCK ExcHANGE, TAXEs-EQuITY CAP-
ITAL-AND OUR ECONOMIC CHALLENGES 38-40 (1953). However, combining
an increased capital gains tax with regular taxation of unrealized stock
appreciation would eliminate this problem.
75. See Slawson, note 19 supra.
For the closely-held corporation, there is no public market, and non-
market appraisal of stock can be extraordinarily difficult. Therefore, re-
tained earnings in the close corporation could be allocated to individual
shareholders for taxation at regular intervals.
Such a method of taxation in a publicly-held corporation with a multi-
class capital structure would be extremely impractical because of the diffi-
culty of allocating earnings to the various equity interests. If, for example,
dividends on cumulative preferred stock were always paid, there would
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proposal, while probably more progressive in its impact, has the
disadvantage of being considerably more complex than a corpo-
rate-level tax on retentions. Both proposals, however, deserve
serious consideration as alternatives to the taxation of stock divi-
dends in order to limit the sheltering of retained earnings from
shareholder ordinary income taxes.
be no question how to allocate retained earnings to common stock. But
suppose that although earnings are available, preferred dividends are
skipped and arrearages accumulated. Since the preferred arrearages have
priority over common stock dividend and liquidation rights, it would be
unfair to allocate to the common stock all earnings retained by skipping
preferred dividends. On the other hand, the preferred arrearages may not
be satisfied for a number of years, if at all. Therefore, it would be unfair
to allocate these earnings in their entirety to the preferred stock. In the-
ory, the proper amount to allocate to the preferred could be calculated
by estimating the present value of the arrearage rights with any residual
allocated to the common stock. In practice, however, such estimates would
not possess a high degree of accuracy since they require specifying how
far in the future and with what degree of confidence the market expects
arrearage rights to be satisfied.
A similar problem exists when there are securities convertible into
common stock. Unless the conversion right has no market value, it would
be unfair to allocate retained earnings in their entirety to the common
stock since they may be subject to future dilution. On the other hand,
it would be unfair to treat the convertible securities as if they were con-
verted for the purpose of allocating retained earnings since they may not
all be converted into common stock. In theory, one might construct an
allocation formula by estimating the number of securities that will be con-
verted. In practice, however, such estimates would probably be highly
inaccurate. See H. SIMONS, supra note 19, at 189-96.
